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NOTES
NORTHERN CHEYENNE TRIBE v. ADSIT
James L. Vogel
I. INTRODUCTION
The McCarran Amendment, ' passed in 1952, grants a limited waiver
of federal sovereign immunity by permitting joinder of the United States in
state water rights adjudication. The United States Supreme Court, in
Dugan v. Rank,2 required the presence of a complete adjudication of an
entire river system in an ongoing state court proceeding before the waiver
would be effective.' In United States v. District Court for Water Division
No. 5," and United States v. District Court for Eagle County,5 the
Supreme Court further interpreted the McCarran Amendment to allow
joinder not only in claims involving federal rights acquired pursuant to
state law, but also in claims involving federal reserved rights.'
In Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United StatesJ
commonly referred to as the Akin case, the Court held that the McCarran
Amendment permitted state adjudication of Indian reserved rights.8
Montana, in recent legislation,9 claims the right to adjudicate all water
rights claims in the state, including Indian reserved rights.10 In a 1979 joint
opinion, the three divisions of the United States District Court of Montana
deferred to that state's legislation and dismissed seven suits brought by the
United States and one Indian tribe to determine Indian and federal rights
in Montana river systems." The United States and the tribe appealed these
1. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976). As codified the Amendment reads:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the
administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is in
the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by
exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit.
2. 372 U.S. 609 (1963).
3. Id. at 617-19.
4. 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
5. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
6. 401 U.S. at 529 and 401 U.S. at 524.
7. 424 U.S. 800 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Akin].
8. Id. at 809-13.
9. S.B. #76,1979 Mont. Laws, ch. 697 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. [hereinafter MCA] §§ 3-
7-101 to -502,85-2-211 to -243,85-2-701 to-704,2-15-212 (1981); amending §§ 3-5-111,85-2-102, -
112, -113, -114, -401 and -406; repealing §§ 35-2-201 to -210.
10. See MCA §§ 85-2-701 to -704 (1981).
11. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Users, 484 F. Supp. 31 (D.C. Mont.
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dismissals, and in Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit,12 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decisions.'" The
court of appeals distinguished Adsit from Akin by finding significantly
different facts in each case, and by finding that Montana did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over Indian lands in either its enabling
legislation14 or its constitution."6 Recognizing the importance of this case,
the United States Supreme Court granted Montana's petition for a writ of
certiorari.' 6 Because of the importance of Adsit to the state of Montana,
non-Indian water users, and the seven tribes in Montana, the main holding
in this case is worth reviewing to determine its validity.
II. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
Until 1973, Montana did not have a comprehensive means for
protecting the rights of individual water users, or for quantifying claims in
order to plan for future needs." In 1973, the Montana Legislature
attempted to address this need by enacting the Montana Water Use Act.18
This attempt was subsequently refined and expanded in 1979 when the
legislature passed a bill commonly referred to as "Senate Bill #76."'19 This
legislation was an attempt to correct deficiencies which had surfaced in the
1973 Act.20 In 1975, three suits were filed in the three divisions of the
United States District Court of Montana seeking an adjudication of the
rights of two Indian tribes and the federal government to water in southeast
1979). Actions had been filed in the Billings, Great Falls and Missoula divisions of the Montana United
States District Court: United States v. Abell, No. 79-33-M (D. Mont. 1979); United States v. AMS
Ranch, Inc., No. 79-22-GF (D. Mont. 1979); United States v. Aageson, No. 79-21-GF (D. Mont.
1979); United States v. Aasheim, No. 79-40 BLG (D. Mont. 1979); United States v. Bighorn Low Line
Canal, No.75-34 BLG (D. Mont. 1975); United States v. Tongue River Water Users Ass'n, No. 75-20
BLG (D. Mont. 1975); Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Users Ass'n, No. 75-6 BLG
(D. Mont. 1975).
12. 668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter referred to as Adsit].
13. Id. at 1090.
14. 25 Stat. 676 (1889).
15. MONT. CONsT. art. I, quoted at 668 F.2d 1084, 1087.
16. 103 S.Ct. 50 (1982). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1979 refused to recognize the
distinction between states with constitutional disclaimers and those without, and followed Akin in
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 995
(1979). The Adsit decision therefore created adverse holdings between the Ninth and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The Supreme Court also granted petitions for writs of certiorari for two similar
cases decided at the same time as Adsit: Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 668 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 50 (1982), and Arizona v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 668 F.2d 1100 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 50 (1982).
17. A. STONE, MONTANA WATER LAW FOR THE 1980's, 4 (1981).
18. 1973 Mont. Laws ch. 452.
19. See note 9 supra.
20. See A. STONE, supra note 17, at 5, 6. Judging from the amount of time it was taking to
adjudicate action then pending, it was estimated that it could take a "century or more" to adjudicate
water rights claimed in the entire state.
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Montana."1 By 1979, four more suits were filed in the federal courts to
adjudicate federal rights in Montana streams and rivers bordering or
running through federal or Indian lands.2 Montana filed motions to
dismiss in the first three cases, arguing that state court actions filed in 1975
were the proper means of settling all water rights claims in the state.23
Until 1979 and Senate Bill #76, however, the state did not have a
workable system to adjudicate water rights.24 Action on the suits filed in
federal court was deferred for the purpose of allowing Montana to pass
comprehensive legislation like Senate Bill #76. The three divisions of the
federal district court then issued a joint opinion dismissing the suits in favor
of the "comprehensive" state proceedings.2 5 The courts involved found
that Akin required application of "wise judicial administration" to defer to
the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts.28 The United States, along
with the tribes involved, appealed these decisions to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that in a state which, unlike
Colorado in the Akin case, expressly disclaims jurisdiction over Indian
lands within its constitution and enabling act, the McCarran Amendment
does not grant jurisdiction or repeal the state's disclaimers. 7 The court
found that Montana lacked subject matter jurisdiction over tribes in the
state because of its disclaimers. 28 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
"[t] he power of a court in a disclaimer state to enforce a regulatory statute
that may adversely affect Indians falls far short of the power to adjudicate
a direct challenge to Indian water rights in and to the waters of streams. ' 29
The facts in Adsit were also found to be different enough from those in
Akin to warrant retention of federal court jurisdiction. In Akin the
Supreme Court found "exceptional circumstances" which required dis-
missal pursuant to "wise judicial administration."30 While Akin involved
an ongoing comprehensive adjudication process which the United States
had participated in for years, Montana did not even have a comprehensive
21. See note 11 supra.
22. Id.
23. 668 F.2d at 1083.
24. See A. STONE, supra note 17, at 6.
25. 484 F. Supp. at 36.
26. Id.
27. 668 F.2d at 1084.
28. Id. at 1086.
29. Id. at 1087.
30. 424 U.S. at 817-18.
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plan until four years after the first federal suits were filed. 3' Also, Akin
involved a truly comprehensive proceeding in state court with a concurrent
piecemeal proceeding in federal court. Adsit, meanwhile, involved a
situation where the tribes claimed the state proceeding specifically
excluded some water rights claims, and did not have jurisdiction over
Indian allottees. At the same time, the tribes identified a means to make the
federal court proceeding more comprehensive than Montana's plan.32
The court also found Adsit distinguishable in two less crucial factors.
In Montana both state and federal proceedings were in their infancy.
Additionally, the locations of the federal courts in Montana do not provide
facts for a "forum non conveniens" analysis.33 In Akin these factors had
been important to the overall decision, as the state proceeding had been
ongoing for a number of years when the federal action was filed, and the
federal proceeding was 300 miles from the water district in question.
34
The Ninth Circuit also noted that if conflicts of interest were present
between the United States and the Indian tribes they represent, the state
would not have the authority to join the tribes in state court proceedings."
Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing sovereign immunity
from suit, and without an express waiver of this immunity, an Indian tribe
cannot be sued.36 In Adsit the tribes involved would appear to be necessary
parties if conflicts of interest were present, yet neither Congress nor the
tribes have consented to such a suit in state court. The court refused to
require the tribes to waive their basic right to sovereign immunity by
requiring them to protect their rights in state court water adjudication
proceedings.3 7
IV. SCOPE OF ANALYSIS
A complete analysis of the various factors supporting the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Adsit is beyond the scope of this casenote. Instead this
note will concentrate on the main holding of the Ninth Circuit: Montana's
inability to adjudicate Indian water rights because of disclaimers of
jurisdiction over Indian lands in the state's enabling act and constitution.
A. Congressional Authority
In Akin, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the McCarran
31. 668 F.2d at 1088.
32. Id. at 1089.
33. Id.
34. 424 U.S. at 820.
35. 668 F.2d at 1089.
36. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1979).
37. 668 F.2d at 1090.
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Amendment as it applied to Colorado, a state which, unlike Montana, was
not required to disclaim jurisdiction over Indian lands in its enabling act or
constitution. To determine whether there is a difference between non-
disclaimer and disclaimer states, it is necessary to look at the origin of the
disclaimer provisions.
Congress derives its authority over Indians from a short phrase in the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution granting Congress the
power to "regulate Commerce with the Indian Tribes." 8 The Supreme
Court has long held that this power constitutes virtually unlimited
authority to regulate Indian affairs.39 The policy developed was to leave
Indians free from state jurisdiction. "The treaties and laws of the United
States contemplate the Indian territory as completely separated from that
of the states; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on
exclusively by the government of the union."'40
The Supreme Court raised some doubts about the certainty of these
theories in United States v. McBratney.41 The Court recognized that the
federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over reservations in Colo-
rado before it was granted statehood. However, when Colorado entered the
Union, there was nothing in the enabling act explicitly reserving exclusive
federal jurisdiction over Indians and Indian lands. Therefore, the Court
concluded that the reservation at issue was "no longer within the sole and
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. '42
After this decision, Congress required disclaimer provisions in the
enabling legislation of all states admitted to the Union.43 Apparently,
Congress did not want to leave the door open for states to assert jurisdiction
over Indian lands unilaterally, but wished to reserve authority for such a
move unto itself. As noted previously, this decision clearly was within
Congress' authority as granted by the Constitution.44
Thus it is clear that the disclaimer provisions in Montana's Enabling
Act 45 and constitution46 were not meaningless, but were included for
specific reasons. Montana's constitution provides that the disclaimer shall
"continue in full force and effect until revoked by the consent of the United
States and the people of Montana. ' '47 The McCarran Amendment does not
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
40. Id. at 557. See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-85 (1886).
41. 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
42. Id. at 623, 624.
43. See, e.g. Montana's disclaimers at note 50 infra.
44. See note 38 supra.
45. 25 Stat. 676 (1889). See note 50 infra for text of Act.
46. MONT. CONsT. art. I (1972); see note 50 infra for text of Article I.
47. Id.
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expressly consent to the revocation of Montana's disclaimers. Its legislative
history does not even mention disclaimers. Nevertheless, Congress must
have been aware of such impediments to state jurisdiction, if it intended to
extend such jurisdiction to Indians. Only one year later, 1953, in passing
Public Law 83-280, Congress required states to remove legal impediments
in their constitutions and legislation before assuming jurisdiction over
Indian lands.48
There would appear to be no basis on which to allow the general
language of the McCarran Amendment to repeal impliedly specific
Congressional legislation; the disclaimer provision in Montana's enabling
act. There is no conflict between this conclusion and the intent of the
McCarran Amendment. The amendment was not mandatory, as federal
courts can still be the appropriate forum in some circumstances.4 9 States
will be allowed to bring the federal government into state proceedings in
timely actions not involving Indian reserved rights. It is consistent to
conclude that Indian reserved rights should be adjudicated in federal
courts, as the federal forum was left available, and there are valid reasons,
discussed infra, for adjudicating such suits in federal court.
B. Montana Disclaimers
When reviewing Montana's assertion of jurisdiction over Indian lands
pursuant to the McCarran Amendment, there appears to be serious
problems arising from inconsistent assertions of the jurisdiction now
claimed.
Montana clearly disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian lands in both its
enabling legislation and in its first constitution.5" Pursuant to Public Law
280, the Montana legislature passed a law in 1963, enabling the state to
48. Public Law 83-280, § 6 (1953) states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the
consent of the United States is hereby given to the people of any State to amend, where
necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the case may be, to remove any
legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions of this Act: Provided, That the provisions of this Act shall not become effective
with respect to such assumption of jurisdiction by any such State until the people thereof
have appropriately amended their State constitution or statutes as the case may be.
(Now codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976)).
49. See note 1 supra for text of McCarran Amendment, and Akin, 424 U.S. at 809, for U.S.
Supreme Court affirmance of this statement.
50. Montana's enabling act (25 Stat. 676 (1889)) provides that the state: "disclaim [s] all right
and title to the unappropriated public lands. . .owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes. . ." and
Montana's Constitution (article I, 1972) provides: "[a]ll lands owned or held by any Indian or Indian
tribes shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States,
continue in full force and effect until revoked by the consent of the United States and the people of
Montana.".
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assume jurisdiction over Indian lands with the approval of the tribes.51 The
statute, using language identical to that in Public Law 280, specifically
excluded the right to adjudicate water rights from the jurisdiction of the
state in a section now entitled "Rights, privileges and immunities reserved
to Indians. 52 Apparently, even though the McCarran Amendment was
passed in 1952, as of 1963 Montana did not claim jurisdiction to adjudicate
Indian water rights. In 1968, Congress amended Public Law 280 to require
tribal approval before states could extend criminal or civil jurisdiction over
them.53 In 1972, the people of Montana revised their constitution, and
again, even though the McCarran Amendment was still in effect, and there
existed some case law which said it allowed state jurisdiction over Indian
water rights claims, the new document contained language very similar to
the original disclaimer." Finally, in 1979, the Montana legislature enacted
a statute which expressly asserted jurisdiction over Indian water rights
pursuant to the McCarran Amendment.5
Public Law 280 required states to amend their statutes and/or
constitutions as necessary before assuming jurisdiction over Indian mat-
ters.56 The United States Supreme Court has held that Public Law 280
allows disclaimer states to assume jurisdiction by legislative action.57 The
Montana Supreme Court has held that the earliest disclaimer provision
concerning jurisdiction over Indian lands was legitimately revoked by the
1963 law on assumption of jurisdiction.5 These findings would appear to
clear the path for Montana to have extended state court jurisdiction over
Indian water right claims by passing Senate Bill #76 in 1979.
Nonetheless, this reasoning is seriously flawed in several ways. In
1972, after the McDonald decision purportedly legitimized the 1963
51. 1963 Mont. Laws ch. 81, codified at MCA §§ 2-1-301 to -307 (1981).
52. See MCA § 2-1-304 (1981):
Rights, privileges, and immunities reserved to Indians. Nothing in this part shall:
(1) Authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal
property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or
community that is held in trust by the United States;
(2) authorize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any
federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant thereto;
(3) confer jurisdiction upon the state of Montana to adjudicate, in probate proceed-
ings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest
therein; or
(4) deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community of any right,
privilege, or immunity afforded under federal treaty, agreement, statute, or executive order
with respect to hunting, trapping, fishing, or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof.
53. See 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1976).
54. See note 38 supra.
55. See MCA §§ 85-2-701 to -704 (1981).
56. See 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976).
57. Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 484 (1979).
58. State ex rel. McDonald v. District Court, 159 Mont. 156, 164, 496 P.2d 78, 82 (1972).
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legislative revocation of the constitutional disclaimer, the people of
Montana ratified a revised constitution which contained the allegedly
revoked disclaimer.5 9 In addition, the new constitution was much more
thorough on how it was to be revised.6 0 Nowhere in the procedures for
amending the constitution can one find the method the state supreme court
set out in McDonald. This apparent refusal of the constitutional conven-
tion to recognize the "legislative revocation" of Montana's constitutional
disclaimer concerning jurisdiction of Indian lands would seem to discredit
clearly this method of revocation in Montana. Therefore, it would appear
not only that the 1963 law is invalid, but that S.B. #76 is also invalid insofar
as it attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Indian lands. Montana is not
precluded entirely from exercising jurisdiction over Indian lands under this
rationale, but it appears a constitutional revision is a prerequisite to
assertion of jurisdiction."1
Any constitutional revision of Montana's disclaimer provision at this
time must be done while considering the requirements set forth in Public
Law 280 as amended. As noted previously, the law now requires tribal
approval of any assertion of state jurisdiction over tribal lands.62 The
adjudication of water rights are specifically exempted from the provisions
of Public Law 280, as amended. Also, the United States Supreme Court in
a footnote in Akin commented that this exemption of state court jurisdic-
tion over Indian water rights should not extend to limit the McCarran
Amendment."3
The Akin case, however, did not involve a disclaimer state that had
voluntarily reaffirmed its disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian lands as
59. See note 38 supra.
60. See MoNT. CoNsT. art. XIV (1972), including provisions on "Constitutional Convention,"
"Amendment by legislative referendum," and "Amendment by initiative.".
61. This conclusion is supported by an examination of the 1972 constitutional convention
history. Montana looked primarily to how North Dakota treated its disclaimer when it revised its
constitution in 1958. Article XIII, § 1 of the North Dakota Constitution is nearly identical to
Montana's 1972 disclaimer, except it provides ". . .however, that the legislative assembly of the state
of North Dakota may, upon such terms and conditions as it shall adopt, provide for the acceptance of
such jurisdiction as may be delegated to the state by Act of Congress." Cf. note 50 supra for text of
Montana's disclaimer, and 1972 Constitutional Convention Committee Reports, Vol. II, at 840-41,
1031; Verbatim Transcript, Vol. VII, at 2567.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has recently reviewed North Dakota's disclaimers and laws,
and found the state could not exercise jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising within a
reservation, unless the Indians of the reservation voted to accept jurisdiction. Three Affiliated Tribes,
Etc. v. Wold Eng., P.C.,. -N.D.- , 321 N.W.2d 510,512 (1982),petitionforcert. pending, 103
S.Ct. 441 (1982).
Montana could have at least partially avoided the problems herein described if it had followed
North Dakota's example. The North Dakota Supreme Court provides some guidance as to how these
issues could be determined when reviewed by state courts.
62. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
63. 242 U.S. at 812 n. 20.
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late as 1972. Public Law 280 was much more specific than the McCarran
Amendment as to how disclaimer states could assert jurisdiction over
Indian lands: it required states to amend their statutes and constitutions."
Arguably, the specific requirements of Public Law 280, passed only one
year after the McCarran Amendment, should control the broad general
language of the McCarran Amendment for disclaimer states that wish to
adjudicate Indian water rights. This law provides guidance for a judicial
interpretation of the McCarran Amendment, which allegedly extends
state jurisdiction to Indian lands, just as P.L. 280 was created to do.
Extending this rationale one step further, the Public Law 280
amendment requiring tribal approval before states can assert any further
jurisdiction over Indians could rationally be applied to the McCarran
Amendment as well. Apparently, the McCarran Amendment envisioned
some federal court action for the adjudication of water rights, otherwise it
could have made state court proceedings the exclusive method. 5 Further-
more, limitation of state jurisdiction in this case is consistent with the long-
standing federal policy of federal court jurisdiction over Indians on
reservations, unless jurisdiction is explicitly granted to the states by
congressional statute."
If Montana's disclaimers as to Indian lands are still in full force, it is
still questionable whether these provisions mandate denial of state jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate Indian water rights. The Supreme Court in Akin found:
"The Amendment in no way abridges any substantive claim on behalf of
Indians under the doctrine of reserved rights. '87 In Kake Village v. Egan,68
the Supreme Court held that a disclaimer state could regulate the fishing of
off-reservation Indians by enforcing against non-reservation Indians a
state statute forbidding the use of salmon traps.6 9 The Ninth Circuit, in
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, decided one year previous to
Adsit, relied on Kake and held that a disclaimer state is not precluded from
imposing fishing and hunting license fees on non-Indians on a reservation,
as enabling acts do not force states to disclaim governmental or regulatory
authority over Indian lands.7 0
In Adsit, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the findings in Kake and
White Mountain Apache Tribe, because it found Indian rights to water
64. See 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976).
65. 424 U.S. at 809.
66. Fisher v. District Court of Montana, 424 U.S. 382, 388 (1976); see also Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Morton v. Moncari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974); Minnesota v. United States,
305 U.S. 382 (1939).
67. 424 U.S. at 813.
68. 369 U.S. 70 (1962).
69. Id. at 75.
70. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 649 F.2d 1274, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981).
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more important than regulation of fishing traps or licenses.7 1 Basically, the
court disagreed with the Supreme Court's conclusion in Akin that state
court adjudication of reserved Indian water rights in no way abridges any
substantive Indian claim. While not expressly set forth, this disagreement
would appear to be well-founded. Many factors determinative in the
quantification of reserved Indian water rights have not been fully
adjudicated.
V. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL FORUM
Assignment of priority dates for the Indian reserved rights could vary
from time immemorial to the date such rights were recognized in Winters
v. United States.712 Another unsettled issue is whether reserved quantities
will be quantified based on past or present needs, agricultural or other uses,
and tribal, state, or federal perception of such needs. Even Supreme Court
cases have differed on what standards will be used, depending on the
circumstances of each case.7 a Nevertheless, the laws which have developed
concerning Indian reserved rights have been developed by federal courts.
74
The federal courts have the expertise to deal with the complex federal
statutory and federal caselaw that controls this area. Montana state courts
meanwhile, have never adjudicated reserved Indian water rights because
they have never been within their jurisdiction. It is easily foreseeable that
state courts, accustomed to an appropriative water law system, could
interpret many of the unsettled questions concerning reserved Indian water
rights in the context of Montana law. The choice of law in these cases could
drastically affect the quantity of water apportioned to Montana tribes. In
spite of the Supreme Court's observance in Akin that final judgments of
state courts can be appealed,75 tribes could be justifiably concerned that
review might be unlikely and the standards of review uncertain, especially
since the entire area of law is unsettled.
The Montana Supreme Court's treatment of Indian rights in the past
has been inconsistent and at times seemingly ignorant of established
federal case law.76 Because "water rights" is such a politically explosive
71. 668 F.2d at 1087.
72. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
73. See generally United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1976); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Arizona v. California, 276 U.S. 340 (1964); Federal Power Comm'n v.
Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
For specific comparisons of these and other cases, see Hostyk, Who Controls the Water? The
EmergingBalance Among Federal, State, and Indian Jurisdictional Claims, 18 TuLsA L.J. 35 (1982).
74. Id.
75. 424 U.S. at 813.
76. See, e.g., Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 452, 517 P.2d 893, 897 (1974), Chief
Justice Haswell writing for the court: "The myth of Indian sovereignty has pervaded judicial attempts
by state courts to deal with contemporary Indian problems. Such rationale must yield to the realities of
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issue, it is easily foreseeable that the state courts will decide Indian
reserved water rights decisions quite differently, to the detriment of tribal
interests, than would experienced federal courts."
Further questions concerning the continuing impact on the govern-
mental integrity and sovereignty of tribes were only minimally addressed
in Adsit. Since Akin involved a suit brought solely by the U.S. Govern-
ment, questions of impacts on tribal government were not addressed. The
Supreme Court, however, has previously commented on the significance of
jurisdictional disclaimers on tribal governments:
The upshot ([of] more individualized treatment of. . .statehood
enabling legislation as [it]. . .affect[s] the respective rights of
states, Indians, and the Federal Government) has been the
repeated statements of this Court to the effect that, even on
reservations, state laws may be applied unless such application
would interfere with reservation self-government or would im-
pair a right granted or served by federal law."'
The Adsit case presents a situation where it appears tribal self-
government will be impugned, and a right granted by federal law could be
impaired. The tribal governments, using what appears to be good judg-
ment, decided it would be better to adjudicate their water rights in federal
court.7 ' The federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues
involved, but the state is seeking to interfere with this exercise of tribal self-
government by applying state law. Even if the McCarran Amendment is
construed to grant the state this right, future tribal government decisions
concerning other aspects of their water rights are not even mentioned by
the Amendment. Nevertheless, the laws the state is now trying to apply to
the tribes will require all reservation water users to report all actions to the
state, and some actions are prohibited.80 Certainly the McCarran Amend-
ment, in simply waiving the sovereign immunity of the U.S. Government
for joinder purposes to adjudicate some water rights cases, was not
intended to abrogate substantial rights of tribes to govern themselves. In
modern life, both on and off the reservation."
77. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, 478-79 (1973),
Established pursuant to an act of Congress, 82 Stat. 868 (1968), the National Water Commission, after
studying national water problems for five years, specifically recommended federal courts should have
exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights, with states appearing "parens patriae" for all
other water users, unless a conflict of interest existed. The Commission reasoned: "Because of potential
conflict between Indian and non-Indian users and to avoid suspicion of bias that might attend
adjudication by elected state officials," Indian water rights should be adjudicated in federal courts,
"the traditional forum for this kind of litigation." Id. at 479.
78. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973) (citations omitted).
79. See generally 484 F. Supp. 31, 33 (1979).
80. See, e.g., MCA §§ 85-2-316, "Reservation of waters"; 85-2-401 et seq. "Utilization of
water"; 85-2-221 "Filing of claim of existing water right.".
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the past, limitations on tribal government have required specific congres-
sional language evidencing such intentions.81 The McCarran Amendment
and its legislative history contain no specific language which even hints that
Congress intended to abrogate substantial rights of tribal self-government.
VI. CONCLUSION
The state of Montana would obviously like to see the waivers in its
enabling act impliedly revoked by the McCarran Amendment. This
conclusion would also impliedly authorize application of state law in the
place of potential tribal law on the reservation. In spite of previous action
by the state's constitutional convention, the state would also like to extend
Senate Bill #76 adjudicative procedure to reservation interests. While
certainly understandable, these intentions do not appear consistent with
existing law. The Akin case would have to be stretched substantially
beyond its actual holding to find that it was controlling in the Adsit case. Of
course, the state has a very large interest in adjudicating the water rights in
the state so that future uses and needs can be planned. But as the Supreme
Court noted in Akin, the McCarran Amendment does not require state
courts to be the exclusive forum for adjudicating water rights.8 2
The most comprehensive study ever done on American water policies
specifically recommended that Indian water rights be adjudicated in
federal court, "the traditional forum for this kind of litigation."83 The
Commission envisioned the state involved in such a proceeding action as
"parens patriae" to represent non-Indian interests in the quantification of
Indian rights.8 4 Alternatively, the federal court could appoint special
masters, and even adopt state joinder and service of process methods to be
sure all claimants were made parties to the adjudication process. 85
Findings under either system could then be "plugged" into the state
process. Either method would effectively accomplish the state's goal: to
adjudicate fully and quantify accurately existing water claims in this state.
Congress has plenary power to regulate the affairs of Indian tribes.
This power was specifically set out in Montana's enabling act and
constitution. It would be inconsistent with current law to imply a waiver of
81. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58-59.
82. Akin, 424 U.S. at 809.
83. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, supra note 77, at 479.
84. Id. Also, there would appear to be a precedent for such a practice in conceptually similar
circumstances. States are not required to join individual water users in interstate suits against other
states. Nevertheless, the findings in such cases are binding against each individual user, even though
not a party in the adjudication process. See generally Nebraska v. Wyoming, 324 U.S. 589 (1945);
Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 (1932); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
85. Adsit, 668 F.2d at 1089.
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this power, and by implication, repeal a specific congressional
act-Montana's enabling legislation. By allowing the federal courts in
Montana to adjudicate the water rights of the tribes involved, the Ninth
Circuit in Adsit chose to follow the strict mandates of the law involved.
Montana certainly has a vested interest in having the quantification
adjudicated in its courts. Nevertheless, Montana will still see its most
important goal accomplished. At the same time, the tribes are allowed to
retain important rights to govern their own resources free of state
intervention. Although it might be "simpler" to allow the state courts to
adjudicate rights of Indian tribes, this option is solely within the purview of
Congress, and as of yet, Congress has not given its authorization for states
to "invade" this area of tribal self-government.
